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DOES COLLECTIVE ACTION INSTITUTIONALIZE RATIONAL CHOICE? CANDIDATE SELECTION IN INDONESIAN POLITICAL PARTIES

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Abstract: *The selection process for local head candidates in the electoral democracy in Indonesia is still closed and confidential. Recruitment regulations are insufficient to control the informal actions of the candidate selection process, which is based on political pragmatism. This paper examines the dynamics of local head candidate selection from the rational choice institutionalism approach, with the collective action perspective. The research method uses content analysis, with analyzed interpretively using the NVivo 12 plus application. Research findings show that candidate selection in political parties is not entirely based on supply and demand but as a rational choice formed from the collective actions of party elites. In deciding the mayoral candidate in Makassar City in Indonesia 2020, political parties are influenced by collective mentality, individual quality, group size and resources in political parties. The conclusion is that the rational choice institutionalism approach through the practices of principal-agent, game-theory and rule-based models occurs in the selection of local head candidates. This rational choice institutionalism approach explains the tension between political actors to maximize personal and group interests in political party institutions.*

Keywords: *Candidate Selection; Collective Action; Rational Choice Institutionalism*

INTRODUCTION

Political parties are political entities to mediate the relationship between the state and citizens. The high expectations of citizens towards political party demand that political parties are more open and accommodating. Political parties must carry out the main functions to sustain the party system, the general election system and the political representation system (Sartori 2005). Political parties play an essential role in a state. They have cadre officers where national and local leaders emerge. Political parties can provide checks and balances even when

not in power by becoming opposition in democratic forums (Jeffs *et al.* 2016). One of the main functions of political parties is the continuous recruitment of cadres. The goal is to supply cadres, who will be promoted to seize the formation of political positions. The candidate selection stage in political parties is still subject to bias, from the formal provisions that are regulated to the informal practices that are carried out. Selection authority and the place of authoritative decision-making are often at the party's highest level. Indeed, in many countries, candidate selection is one of the fundamental rights of local and national party units (Detterbeck 2016; Naumovska and Milka 2022).

The landscape of the party system in post-reform Indonesia has changed. This situation affects the centralization, democratization of governance and decision-making in political parties, including the selection of local head candidates. Efforts to encourage transparency in the selection of candidates and the grass-root level participation of party members are not determined by the formal degree of decentralization. There is always an informal mechanism by the party's national elite to control the candidate selection process. Thus, all strategic decisions of the party are controlled by the elite leadership of political parties, who then build their respective oligarchic thrones (Hadiz and Robiso 2013; Tan *et al.* 2015; Winters 2014).

Table 1: Political Parties Participating in the 2014 and 2019 General Elections in Indonesia (Source: General Election Commissions (KPU) 2014, 2019)

Number	Elections in 2014	Elections in 2019
1	*Partai Nasdem*	*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)*
2	*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)*	*Partai Gerindra*
3	*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*	*PDI - Perjuangan*
4	*PDI-Perjuangan*	*Partai Golongan Karya*
5	*Partai Golongan Karya*	*Partai Nasdem*
6	*Partai Gerindra*	*Partai Garuda*
7	*Partai Demokrat*	*Partai Berkarya*
8	*Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)*	*Partai Keadilan Sejahterah (PKS)*
9	*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)*	*Partai Perindo*
10	*Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat*	*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)*
11	*Partai Aceh* (Local Party in Aceh)	*Partai Solidaritas Indonesia (PSI)*
12	*Partai Daerah Aceh* (Local Party in Aceh)	*Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)*
13	*Partai Nasional Aceh* (Local Party in Aceh)	*Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat*
14	*Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB)*	*Partai Demokrat*
15	*Partai Keadilan & Persatuan Indonesia*	*Partai Aceh* (Local Party in Aceh)
16	-	*Partai SIRA* (Local Party in Aceh)
17	-	*Partai Daerah Aceh* (Local Party in Aceh)
18	-	*Partai Nangroe Aceh* (Local Party in Aceh)
19	-	*Partai Bulan Bintang*
20	-	*Partai Keadilan & Persatuan Indonesia (PKPI)*

Table 1 shows the list of political parties that have contested the general election in Indonesia in the last ten years. The requirements for participation in the general election are assessed in administrative verification and factual verification, including the presence of core political party administrators at the central level, at least 30% female representation, and permanent offices building of political party at the Central Executive Board level. Then at the provincial level, there are additional requirements, namely 75% membership at the regency and city levels in 34 provinces in Indonesia. The last requirement, namely the distribution of the party administrators to at least 50% of the sub-districts in 75% of the regencies/cities in 34 provinces in Indonesia. Local parties in the Province of the Special Region of Aceh in the 2014 and 2019 Elections based on the implementation of Law Number 11 of 2006 concerning the Government of Aceh. Meanwhile, the Gelora Party, established on October 28, 2019, has officially become the party supporting the local head candidate in the 2020 local election.

In the practice of democracy in Indonesia, political parties play an essential role in selecting and recruiting candidates for the chief executive to be carried out. The basis for determining support is based on the number of seats in the legislature. This candidate selection framework applies at the national and local government levels. The party with a large number of seats will be the leading strategic power in determining the support for local head candidates. Without a dominant legislative seat, political parties will join power to form a coalition in carrying out candidates. Political recruitment in local elections can be oriented towards the direction of a coalition of political parties, determining who is promoted based on political initiatives from a network of coalition actors. The main coalition actors are political party elites, candidates, sponsors, winning teams, political consultants, pollsters and voters. These political actors are directly involved in the stages, starting from voter registration, selection and nomination of candidates, determination of candidates, registration of candidates, campaigns, voting and vote counting, and determination of elected candidates.

Since 2005, local leaders have been elected through direct democracy to exercise decentralized power, but local leaders selected by political parties have been decided centrally (Budi 2020; Reuter 2015). There is a misleading relationship between internal democratization and the level of decentralization of political power externally. Political parties are increasingly undemocratic and centralized in decision-making. In a centralized political party, the relationship between the candidate and the supporting party is principal-agent. In selecting local head candidates, there is the role of an agent (middleman) who regulates the interaction mechanism between candidates, sponsors and party elites at the national level. The parties' formal regulations cannot restrict informal action in candidate selection practices.

Based on that phenomenon, candidate selection has transformed from supply and demand to rational choice action. The candidate selection arena becomes a place for 'buying and selling transactions to get support as the local head candidates. Almost all parties have Organization Guidelines and other formal rules for the process of candidates for local heads. Likewise, the Selection Team, Candidate Selection Team, Desk of Local Election, and the selectors who carry out the selection stages. Such as through survey mechanisms, fit and proper tests, or informal mechanisms.

The candidate selection stage begins when the political party determines who is a suitable figure to support as a candidate on the election ballot. Candidate selection is one of

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the strategic functions of a political party in a democracy (Hazan and Rahat 2006). Many studies have been conducted on political parties' systems, procedures, and candidate selection methods (Budi 2020; Detterbeck 2016; Norris 2006; Rahat and Hazan 2001; Vicentini 2019). However, this is still insufficient in explaining the internal candidate model for political parties, especially in the practices of electoral politics in Indonesia. Candidate selection is a strategic stage in political recruitment to produce qualified local leader candidates.

Political recruitment and candidate selection are different activities. Political recruitment is a strategy to attract potential candidates to join for political positions, while candidate selection is a process in which candidates are selected from among potential candidates (Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008). Such is the strategic position of this candidate selection stage, so it is referred to as the "shadow pathways" (Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2019) or as the 'twin sisters' of the general election, followed by political parties (Rahat 2013). To gain power, political parties compete externally in democratic General Elections and internally, political parties also create competition between elites, factions or groups in the selection of candidates to be nominated in the struggle for support for political office formations.

Candidate selection is the process used by political parties to decide which candidates are qualified to represent interests in the competition for elective office (Rahat 2009). Studies on candidate selection relate to power distribution within party organizations, electoral organizations, and the formal rules that govern these processes (Lundell 2004). Several other studies discuss elite determination, political representation and the conditions that determine the selection of candidates (Norris 2006).

Candidate selection practices in some places indicate a closed and confidential situation. The experience of political parties in the United States describes the candidate selection arena with the term 'smoke-filled roo'. The term comes from practical experience in a room at the Blackstone Hotel Chicago in 1920. In that place, Senator Warren G. Harding's candidate selection was decided to represent the Republican Party in the United States Presidential Election. The decision-makers are described as a group of 'cigar men' well-connected with party power in nominating 'dark horse' candidates at odds with the wishes of the larger group (Bagby 1955).

The "secret garden of politics" (Marsh 1988) is another term that describes the secrecy and mysteriousness of candidate selection procedures. No one knows what activities are carried out by a handful of party elites. The analogy of the secret garden of politics in describing the situation of candidate selection is very influential in subsequent studies of political recruitment. Another candidate selection practice in Nigeria shows that the candidate selection process in most political parties is against the continuity of democracy. Trends that openly show the practice of money politics. Another trend that can be observed is that political thuggery and violence are also deployed with greater intensity in elections. In addition, most of the parties in the primaries, where the parties were forced to do so, were also boldly rigged. It is essential to strengthen the internal democracy of each political party so that they can become a catalyst for the continuation of democracy.

This may be achieved by training and retraining party officials in the administration of political parties. Not on party institutions, politicians also need to be reoriented to carry out

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the selection according to the rules (Ojo 2019).

In the practice of electoral democracy in Indonesia, the selection process for local head candidates within political parties is closed (Prianto *et al.* 2021). The existence of formal and written recruitment standards is insufficient to control non-formal actions in the candidate selection process, making the selection arena full of political pragmatism. The opportunistic, pragmatic, and transactional behavior of party elites in the selection process will produce local head candidates with low quality, intellectuality, and integrity (Budi 2020; Hidayaturrahman *et al.* 2020).

The longer the journey of electoral democracy, the more symptoms of stagnation and regression occur. The research results of Budi (2020) found that selecting local heads in political parties, especially the Golkar Party and the PDI-Perjuangan Party is getting further away from democratic procedures. An anomaly is to create local leaders who lead power in a decentralized way. In the practice of electoral politics in Indonesia, institutional factors such as centralization, oligarchy, corporatization, and personalization create a candidate selection mechanism (Budi 2020; Hadiz and Robison 2013; Hopkin 2005; Musella 2015; Reuter 2015; Winters 2014).

Meanwhile, research on candidate selection from a feminist-institutionalist perspective found that the supply and demand-based internal democratization framework for female legislative candidates is still gendered biased (Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2019; Krook 2010). In the case of local elections in Indonesia, the findings of Budi (2020) on the selection of local head candidates show signs of being increasingly centralized and less democratic for the Indonesian situation. The selection of local head candidates further strengthens the pragmatism of money-based support through the strategic role of political investors (Hidayaturrahman *et al.* 2020). Even in forming coalitions of supporting parties, political parties naturally prioritize direct payments from candidates, mostly cash payments, to ensure support seats and long-term protection (Hendawan *et al.* 2021).

Based on the political discourse of democratization and openness on candidate selection in political parties, based on the new institutionalism approach, the variation of the model used is rational choice institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996; Peters 2019). The model is more relevant in explaining how individual interests come from rational calculations, actions, and reactions of other actors. The interaction of rational political actors can lead to competition and conflict that affects the interests of many people. In the rational choice institutionalism approach, society is a collection of pragmatic individuals, and in dealing with a particular institution, the decisions taken are also influenced by exogenous factors. This attitude can develop into cooperation within the institution on the individual's consciousness and adjust his preferences to the people's interests based on the effectiveness calculation. Thus, humans who were initially only rational (who used reason) for individual interests became reasonable humans for collective interests (North 1990; Ostrom 1990). The rational choice approach in politics assumes that individual behavior is motivated by self-interest, maximizing benefits, or, more simply, fulfilling goals (Petracca 1991).

Collective action problems are usually identified with social dilemmas. The problem of collective action is identified as a social dilemma. The typology of collective action problems based on matrix game analysis can be divided into five types: distribution, defection,

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coordination, disagreement, and instability problems (Holzinger 2003).

Based on the rational choice institutionalization approach, this paper will examine the dynamics of local head candidate selection from a collective action perspective. The aim is to identify the selection of local head candidates in the city of Makassar, South Sulawesi. The institutionalization of rational choice can be explained by a collective action approach that includes: molecular mentality, the number of individuals, group size and organizational resources.

RESEARCH METHODS

This study focuses on the system and procedure for selecting local head candidates for political parties. The selection of political parties that are the object of research is based on ideological representations, as well as new parties representing the latest dynamics in candidate selection,




Figure 1: Political Parties that are the Object of Research

Meanwhile, the locus of this research is on the executive board of political parties in the South Sulawesi region. In 2020, there are 12 regencies/cities that hold local head elections simultaneously, including the election of the mayor and deputy mayor of the city of Makassar. The object of this research is the chief and elites of political parties at the provincial and city levels. The selection of this object is based on the position of the Regional Executive Board as a strategic actor, as well as the party mediating the interests of the Branch Executive Board in selecting candidates for Regent/Mayor head. This research is based on a qualitative approach, which uses content analysis in analyzing texts sourced from various types of research documents, such as field interviews, news and public opinion in online media and social media. Therefore, the researcher summarizes the data into a single unit in this content analysis. The argument explains the content of the data in the entire text by defining the data from the text into a single concept, where the concept has a meaning that describes the document's original text (Film 2009). Qualitative data analysis was carried out with the NVivo 12 Plus software.




Figure 2: Data Collection and Analysis Techniques with NVivo 12 Plus

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Collective Action Candidate Selection in Makassar Mayoral Election 2020

The formation of collective actions and individual and group preferences will form a value for achieving collective goals. Systemic, practical, and normative institutions will determine individual and group preferences (Krook, 2010). Systemic institutions are formal political system characteristics, such as party and electoral systems. Practical institutions related to formal and informal criteria as a condition for participation, including the applicable balloting system. Meanwhile, normative institutions emphasize more substantive matters, such as the prevailing principles of equality and representation.

Collective Mentality

The collective mentality is the creation of uniformity of interests, cooperation, ability to resolve conflicts, rule-making, and appreciation at the level of heterogeneity (Pranietha-Mudliar 2016). Collective mentality understands that small groups are also rational with their interests, but their goals will not be achieved without achieving collective interests or with the larger group. A collective mentality is an act in institutions as a subjective mental construct that individuals use to interpret the world around them and make choices. Collective action from a review of the collective mentality of political parties can be seen in the Technical Guidelines for selecting local head candidates. The existing regulations in political parties show the similarity of interests, cooperation, ability and resolve conflicts within the organization.




Figure 3: Internal Regulations of Political Parties in the Selection of Local Head Candidates (Source: Processed by researchers using NVivo 12 Plus)

Figure 3 shows a content analysis of the internal rules of political parties based on Party Articles of Association or Party technical rules and candidate selection Guideline, which mainly regulates the stages, requirements and mechanisms for the selection of local heads. It was found that several parties did not regulate in detail the formal mechanism for determining candidates for local head candidates. Of all political parties that are the object of research, the Demokrat Party gets the highest score, namely 48%, because the Demokrat Party in detail and regulates the formal mechanism for determining candidates for local heads in the Party Articles of Association or Party technical rules and candidate selection Guideline. The Demokrat Party Regulation Number 02/PO/DPP contains the complete regulation on candidate selection on Party Regulation No. PD/I/2020 concerning the local election of Local Heads and Vice-Local Heads. In organizational regulations, the Demokrat Party selects candidates in stages, selection, nomination, and determination by the Party High Assembly.

The political party similar to the completeness of the formal rules for selecting candidates for the Demokrat Party is the PDI-Perjuangan Party. PDI-Perjuangan Party gets a reasonably high percentage of 48%; this party does not explain in detail the mechanism for selecting candidates in the Party Articles of Association or Party technical rules. Still, the mechanism is very detailed in Party Regulation No. 04/2015 on selecting PDI-Perjuangan Party local heads candidates.

The regulation explains that the selection is carried out in stages. Registration is opened by the party structure, starting from the party structure at the local level to the national level. After that, the party conducts administrative verification of the prospective candidates who register, and the prospective candidates who pass the verification are reported to the Central Executive Board. The candidate's character, party solidity, and willingness to comply with party policies will be analyzed at this stage. The final step is the determination of the elected candidate will be determined by the Central Executive Board.

Other political parties, such as Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) Party and Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) Party, have formal rules in Party Articles of Association or Party

technical rules, as well as special party regulations regarding the stages of determining the selection of local head candidates. Still, the written rules are not as complete as those of the Demokrat Party and PDI-Perjuangan Party. Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) Party formally has Party Regulation No 3/2015 concerning the Winning of Local Heads/Vice Local Heads. Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) Party regulates the candidate selection stages in Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) Party Regulation No.2/020 concerning the Selection, Determination, and Winning of Candidate for Governor/Vice-Governor, Mayor/Vice-Mayor and Regent/Vice-Regent.

Meanwhile, the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) Party regulates the mechanism for selecting local head candidates in the Party Articles of Association or Party technical rules. Still, it does not have a specific party regulation regarding selecting local head candidates, which must be open and democratic. The new political party, Partai Solidaritas Indonesia (PSI) Party, does not regulate the recruitment of local head candidates in the Party Articles of Association or Party technical rules but has a party regulation regarding the convention for selecting local head candidates. Meanwhile, another new party, the Gelora Party, only regulates the decision-making mechanism for recruiting political officials in the Party Articles of Association or Party technical rules. The Gelora Party got the worst percentage in the formal regulation of the local head candidate selection mechanism. There was no detailed explanation, and no supporting regulations explicitly made to select local head candidates.

The various forms of differences built by each political party can be simplified into keywords, which become the distinguishing characteristics of the selected candidates. Visually, these keywords can shape the movement of the text freely (Figure 4).



Figure 4: Keywords in the Selection of Candidates for Political Parties (Source: Processed by researchers using NVivo 12 Plus)

Word cloud analysis is a metadata visualization of keywords in digital discourse, visualized textually from various sources such as; social media, and online media from the official website. The higher the frequency level of the keyword, the more prominent it will be compared to other keywords. Based on the word cloud analysis processed with the NVivo 12 plus application, the selection of candidates for Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Makassar City 2020

in political parties displays keywords formed from the values, character and organizational culture of political parties. Nationalist parties such as PDI-Perjuangan Party display keywords; party cadres, and ideology, while Partai Solidaritas Indonesia (PSI) Party, a new party, presents keywords; deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) party and anti-corruption issues. The Demokrat Party came up with keywords; achievement and political capital. Religious nationalist parties such as Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) Party present keywords; trustworthy (amanah) and visionary. Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) Party gave birth to keywords; humanity and moderate. Religious-based parties such as Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) Party introduced the terms 'helicopter-view' and trustworthy (amanah), and the Gelora Party was present with the keywords; innovative and electability factor. Overall, the keyword wedge and the frequency of word use resulted in the keywords; trustworthy, visionary, and innovative being the buzz-words in the candidate selection process for the Mayor and Vice-Mayor Makassar City 2020 local election.

Individual Quality

Individual qualities will determine actions that allow a person access to all the resources needed for collective action (Poteete and Ostrom 2004). The individual strength of the elites determines the collective action of political parties in decision-making.

The strength of individuals in political parties can be seen from the social-economic status of party leadership, starting from the lowest to the highest level. In Indonesian politics, the developed party is more characterized by a catchall party, which does not yet have a clear and specific social basis, so it still depends on personal character. The figure who becomes the chief of a political party is more dominantly determined based on his financial ability. Chiefs of political parties are usually those who can finance political parties' participation in the elections. Based on this rationality, the chief of a political party with no financial capacity usually has a leadership position that will not be stable and last for a long time. In the leadership profile of political parties at the local and regional or branch levels, there are variations in the background and socio-economic status of the elites of political parties.




Figure 5: Socio-Economic Status of the Party Elite at the Local Level 2019-2024 (Source: Processed by researchers using NVivo 12 Plus)

Figure 5 illustrates the diversity or variation in the socio-economic background of the political party elites. The socio-economic status owned mainly by the party elite is the background of social activists of various types, be it religious authority, social activists, humanitarian, social activists, or youth social activists. Socio-economic status based on social activists exists in five political parties, namely the Gelora Party, Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) Party, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) Party, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) Party and Partai Solidaritas Indonesia (PSI) Party. Other socio-economic statuses, such as professionals, business people, academics, leaders of community organizations and religious authorities, are each evenly distributed in several political parties.

Group Size

Group size influences collective action strategies. Smaller groups increase higher levels of trust; larger groups increase the costs of collective action (Poteete 2006). Group size is positively related to the spectrum of collective actions and is influenced by production technology, the degree of exclusion, cohesiveness, supply, and heterogeneity within the group. The larger the group size, the more difficult it will be for local head candidates to negotiate interests between group members, meaning that groups built with small sizes are likely to work more effectively. However, the more diverse the interests of group members, the more complicated it is to formulate a collective agreement. One of the group sizes for political parties can be measured by the number of representative seats in the legislature and the strength and completeness of the party's institutional structure at all levels.




Figure 6: Number of Representatives of Political Parties 2019-2024
(Source: General Election Commission 2020)

The number of seats acquired at the national, provincial and local levels is not always congruent. So that the size of the group in a political party is not always based on power at the national level. The party that wins the general election at the national level does not support the ruling party locally, and *vice versa*.

Table 2: Strength of Political Party Organizational Structure (Source: General Election Commission 2020)

Political parties	Structural strength
PDI-Perjuangan Party	Organizational structure (Complete)
Partai Solidaritas Indonesia (PSI) Party	Organizational structure (Incomplete)
Demokrat Party	Organizational structure (Complete)
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) Party	Organizational structure (Complete)
Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) Party	Organizational structure (Complete)
Gelora Party	Organizational structure (Incomplete)
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) Party	Organizational structure (Complete)

Table 2 and Figure 6 show that the size of political party groups in Indonesia varies widely. PDIP and Democrats are political parties with tremendous local power regarding the number of representatives in the legislature and the party structure. While the two parties have small group sizes, namely the PSI and Gelora parties, the new parties have not even completed structures to reach a grassroots voter base. Collective action is an aggregate of internal dynamics that aims to increase the size of a group over other groups. Through coordination and organizational consolidation, in achieving common goals.

The number of members, symbolic models, social class, religious class, ethnicity, discrimination, and the idea of superiority (Mudliar 2016). The group size significantly influences the candidate selection process, as happened in the Local Head Election in South Sulawesi, especially in Makassar City. The size of the political party groups for each candidate in the Makassar Mayor Election 2020 is represented in Table 3.

Table 3: Political Party Support for Candidates in the 2020 Mayoral Election in Makassar City (Source: General Election Commissions 2020)

Candidate Pair	Political Parties	Chairs Amount
Moh. Ramdhan Pomanto – Fatmawati Rusdi	Nasdem, Gerindra, PBB and Gelora	11
Munafri Arifuddin – Abd. Rahman Bando	Demokrat, PPP, Perindo, PSI	13
Syamsul Rizal – Fadli Ananda	PDIP, PKB, Hanura, Garuda	10
Irman Yasin Limpo – Andi Zunnun NurdiHalid	Golkar, PKS, PAN, Berkarya, PKPI	16

Table 3 shows that each candidate has a relatively even size of the political party group that carries it. The completion of four pairs of candidates has shown a democratic candidate selection process, compared to the Makassar City election in 2018, which only produced a single candidate. The even distribution of political party coalition support among the four pairs of candidates does not reflect a democratic candidacy process. The four pairs of

candidates all have personal and organizational affinities with traditional political clans in local power. The dynamics of competing for recommendations and support from political parties in candidate selection are uncertain.

Organizational Resources

Collective action will make the power of groups outside political parties a collective resource by using costs adjusted to the institution's degree. Resources for collective action can be measured through personal party networks and party organizations.




Figure 7: Personal Networks and Elite Party Organizations at the Local Level (Source: General Election Commission 2020)

Figure 7 shows ten major groups that have power in the political party network. The dominant group with a network of political parties is the business sector and bureaucracy. The network with the business sector is owned by PDIP, PKS and Gelora, while the network with bureaucrats is owned by the PDIP and PAN parties. Then four influential groups are closely related to religious identity, namely Da'wah activities, BKPRMI, Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama. The network of political party elites distributed over these large groups will increase the interest in determining local head candidates. Decision-making in political parties can be influenced by several network groups (Røed 2021).

Table 4: The Professional Background of the 2020 Makassar Mayor Candidate Pair (Source: General Election Commissions 2020)

Candidate Pair	Information
Moh. Ramdhan Pomanto - Fatmawati Rusdi	Incumbent Mayor, Architect - Woman Politicians
Munafri Arifuddin - Abd. Rahman Bando	Businessman - Senior Bureaucrat
Syamsu Rizal - Fadli Ananda	Incumbent Vice-Mayor, Humanitarian Activist, Young Entrepreneurs
Irman Yasin Limpo - Andi Muh. Zunnun Armin	Senior Bureaucrat, Young Politician

Based on the backgrounds of all mayoral and deputy mayoral candidates in the 2020 Makassar City Election, most are bureaucrats, politicians and business people and are dominated by men. The supporting political parties are distributed to four candidates with different party ideologies. Political parties with similar ideologies do not have to form coalitions to contest local head elections. For example, Islamic-based religious parties are distributed in each candidate, no. 1, PBB Party; no. 2, PPP Party, no. 3 PKB Party; and no. 4 PKS Party and PAN Party. This indicates that ideological similarities are not the basis for building political coalitions in nominating a local head candidate.

Collective Action and Institutionalization of Rational Choices in the Candidate Selection

The perspective of rational choice institutionalism provides insight into the social characteristics, structure and behavior of individuals in an institution. In this approach, institutions are conceptualized as rules and incentives that set the conditions for finite rationality, in which political actors need each other functionally. The individual attitude of politicians always seeks to maximize self-interest, but the choices are inherently limited. Limitation of action is carried out because each individual operates within a set of rules from one or more institutions. However, there is always a belief that the goal of a small group can only be achieved if it is carried out in the form of collective actions in a larger group, or what is called collective mentality (Agrawal and Goyal 2001). In addition to being determined by collective mentality, the act of rational choice in achieving goals is also influenced by the size and diversity of the group (Agrawal and Goyal 2001; Poteete and Ostrom 2004).

The effect of heterogeneity and group size determines institutional performance. There are always challenges and opportunities facing individuals in groups who collectively use shared resources. Groups with high heterogeneity will design institutions that allow them to benefit from each other, complement each other, and build stronger foundations for collective action. While larger groups can cope with higher transaction costs, they can also use more shared resources than smaller groups engaging in collective action. Utilization of shared resources according to the agreement of internal groups in collective action (Agrawal and Goyal 2001; Ostrom 1991).

In practice, the collective action perspective will direct how the application of rational choice institutionalism is carried out on three institutional role models in the selection of candidates for local heads in political parties, consisting of principal-agent, game-theory, and rule-based (Peters 2019).

Principal-Agent Model

The main focus of the rational choice institutionalism approach is two-way, consisting of the main directions; how institutions control the behavior of agents and from different directions how agents try to take advantage of institutions to achieve their interests (Putra and Sanusi 2019). Even when actors feel that the existing institutions cannot facilitate achieving goals, there will be efforts to make institutional changes (Peters 2019).

Chiefs of political parties will follow the organization's rules to achieve goals, while

candidates for local heads will take advantage of opportunities from political party regulations to be supported. When each actor, chief of political parties and candidates for local heads, considers that political parties and their internal regulations will not be able to facilitate the achievement of their goals, both parties will encourage adjustments to regulations or institutional rules of the game. Political party leaders can open a privileged space to accommodate local head candidates, who can provide personal and group benefits.

Game-Theory Model

The principal-agent model does not establish an equal relationship between the leader (principal) and followers (agent). There is always a subordination in the relationship between the principal and the agent. Meanwhile, in the game-theory model, all actors in the political arena are in an equal position with their respective interests. The interaction of actors is a form of compliance with the rules of the game set by the competent authority. The existing game rules provide incentive and disincentive schemes for the parties to gain profits in the political arena.

In the local head candidate selection dynamics, a candidate can build a new political identity only to penetrate the support mechanism in political parties. When the legitimacy of support cannot be obtained, then with another political identity, the candidate will pursue new support. There is an equal relationship between the party's chief and the candidates in this position. Candidates are no longer agents controlled by the party's chief as principals. All political actors work with their agendas and interests. Collective action aspects, such as party rules, group size and political power of parties, and ownership of party networks and resources, candidates will switch to other political parties when not taking sides. This model builds a competitive relationship between political actors and their political base. Vice versa, the party leadership does not determine support validity if the candidate cannot fulfill the terms and conditions applicable to the political party. The game's control is not centered on the party's chief but is owned by the local head candidates.

Rule-Based Model

The rule-based model focuses on institutional aspects, no longer looking at actors' interests. This model corrects interaction patterns that rely on free market mechanisms, with the character of free-fight competition. Institutions are used to solve market failures in managing common resources (Ostrom 1990). Without the rules of the game, it will not be easy to control the behavior of actors, which will create a balance situation and not interfere with the common interest. Institutions and rules of the game are formed to achieve organizational balance and stability. Agreed rules of the game will control the irrational actions of actors and reduce uncertainty.

In the candidate selection process, all political parties have written formal rules. Special rules for candidate selection are also presented to prevent free riders from capitalizing on the support of local head candidates. The candidate selection mechanism is generally found in the Party Articles of Association or Party technical rules of political parties and party

organization guidelines. General matters such as the mechanism, terms and stages, and the organizing structure for the candidate selection are regulated. The more detailed and explicit the selection rules and the higher the commitment to implementing these rules, the higher the legitimacy of every decision taken by the leadership of a political party. Political parties with good candidate selection institutionalization will not produce decisions with resistance from their internal members.

The challenge is whether all formal rules and institutions are executed optimally in all local head candidate selection dynamics. In practice, the formal rules of political party organization are still often negotiated by the informal behavior of political party leaders, elites and candidates. The stages, mechanisms, and conditions for obtaining legal support give specific political networks and groups the privilege. Some candidates can be shortcuts to party leaders at the national level without going through a selection at the local level.

CONCLUSION

The rational choice institutionalism approach emphasizes that political party actors are a collection of pragmatic individuals. In dealing with a political institution, the decisions taken are influenced by exogenous factors. This attitude can be controlled into a cooperative interaction within an institution. The individual consciousness of the political party elite, which was initially irrational for individual interests, turned into rational human beings for collective interests. Collective action sees institutions as instruments in regulating the relationship between actors and their respective interests in achieving common goals.

Selection of local head candidates in political parties is a practical form of collective action influenced by collective mentality, individual quality, group size and organizational resources. The rational choice institutionalism approach through principal-agent, game-theory and rule-based model practices can explain the dynamics of local head candidate selection in political parties. This rational choice institutionalism approach can explain the tension of relations between actors in utilizing political party institutions.

COMPLIANCE WITH ETHICAL STANDARDS

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